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CIVIC HERALD
HR 6875 · 119th Congress · HouseOther

AI OVERWATCH Act

In plain language: This bill immediately cancels existing export permits and halts sales of high-performance artificial intelligence and data center microchips to companies based in or owned by entities in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela. Before any new export licenses can be granted, federal agencies must submit detailed security evaluations and certify that the transfers will not cause domestic chip shortages, aid foreign militaries, or undermine U.S. computing leadership, while giving Congress 30 days to veto any sale. The measure also creates a streamlined process for vetted U.S. tech firms to deploy advanced chips to friendly countries without individual licenses, provided they meet strict cybersecurity standards and keep most of their computing power within the United States.

Provisional: our plain-language summary, pending review.

Provisionalunreviewed: impact, issue tags, provisions, stakeholders, summary
People affected—The bill regulates corporate entities and export transactions in the semiconductor and artificial intelligence sectors without specifying headcount or population figures.
Fiscal magnitude—CBO cost estimate published (H.R. 6875, Artificial Intelligence Oversight of Verified Exports and Restrictions on Weaponizable Advanced Technology to Covered High-Risk Actors Act, 2026-02-02); dollar figure pending review extraction — see receipt
Reach62provisional · pending reviewrigor: heuristic llm
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Issues

What this bill touches.

Trade & tariffs−50AI & emerging tech+40

The sign shows the bill's direction on each issue (+ toward, − away); the number is its magnitude. Color never encodes good or bad, and never party.

Who it affects

Who it helps · who it burdens.

Who it helps

  • Designated trusted United States personsGains an exemption from certain export licensing requirements when transferring advanced chips to non-concern countries, provided the chips remain under their ongoing ownership and operational control (Sec. 2(1758A)(d)(1)).provisional

Who it burdens

  • Exporters of advanced integrated circuits and data center hardwareImmediately terminates their existing export licenses for advanced data-center integrated circuits, temporarily halts new license approvals, and subjects future exports to stringent licensing certifications and potential congressional vetoes (Sec. 2(1758A)(b), (c), (e), (f)).provisional
  • Entities connected to designated countries of concern (China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela)Loses access to existing export licenses for covered integrated circuits, which are immediately cancelled, and faces a temporary ban followed by strict licensing limits on receiving advanced data-center chips (Sec. 2(1758A)(b), (c), (e), (f)).provisional
  • U.S. companies seeking trusted person designationMust comply with new cybersecurity and physical security rules, limit foreign ownership from countries of concern to 10%, maintain the majority of aggregate processing capacity domestically, and undergo annual audits (Sec. 2(1758A)(d)(2)).provisional
  • Department of Commerce (Bureau of Industry and Security)Tasked with establishing trusted person standards, providing detailed 30-day advance certifications and analyses to Congress before issuing licenses, and co-authoring a national security assessment with other federal agencies (Sec. 2(1758A)(c), (d)(2), (g)).provisional

Dollar-level funding (FEC sector totals) is coming in a later phase.

What it does

The provisions, in plain language.

  1. Requires specific, individual government licenses to export, reexport, or transfer advanced data-center integrated circuits to entities headquartered in or tied to designated countries of concern (China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela), and prohibits the use of general blanket licenses.

    Sec. 2(1758A)(b)provisional

  2. Requires the Department of Commerce to submit detailed license applications and national security certifications to Congress at least 30 days before approving any covered chip export to a country of concern, and blocks the license if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 days.

    Sec. 2(1758A)(c)provisional

  3. Exempts chip exports to destinations outside countries of concern from certain licensing rules if the chips remain owned and controlled by certified 'trusted United States persons,' and directs Commerce to create certification standards covering cybersecurity, foreign ownership limits, and domestic processing capacity.

    Sec. 2(1758A)(d)(1)-(2)provisional

  4. Immediately terminates all previously approved export licenses for covered integrated circuits destined for entities connected to countries of concern.

    Sec. 2(1758A)(e)provisional

  5. Bars the approval of any export licenses for covered integrated circuits to entities linked to countries of concern until 14 days after the required national security strategy is delivered to Congress.

    Sec. 2(1758A)(f)provisional

  6. Directs the Secretary of Commerce, along with other federal agencies and the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a national security strategy to Congress assessing the risks of foreign access to advanced chips and evaluating China's chipmaking and artificial intelligence capabilities.

    Sec. 2(1758A)(g)provisional

How your members of Congress line up

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Timeline

How it moved.

  1. Jan 21, 2026Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 2.
  2. Dec 18, 2025Introduced in House
  3. Dec 18, 2025Introduced in House

The original text

Read it for yourself.

Read the original text →

Sources & provenance

Congress.govrefreshed 17 days ago

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