Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2026
The provisions, in plain language.
Bars federal officers and employees from looking at the content of a person's communications (or other data that would normally need a probable-cause warrant) that a government search of intelligence databases turns up about that person, unless they first get a court order or warrant; narrow exceptions allow access only in a genuine life-threatening emergency, with the person's consent, or for defensive cybersecurity.
Lets a court throw out, and bars the government from using in any court, grand jury, or other proceeding, any data accessed in violation of these new query rules — a suppression remedy with teeth.
Forbids a federal officer from running a database query at all unless the search is both reasonably likely to find foreign-intelligence information and made for a significant foreign-intelligence purpose.
Requires the government to create and keep a detailed electronic record of every covered query and every access — the search terms used, the date, who ran it, and a written justification — and to attribute automated queries to the responsible person, so the searches can later be audited.
Prohibits intentionally targeting a person for surveillance when a significant purpose is to get information about a specific known U.S.-protected person without going through normal warrant channels, closing a 'reverse targeting' workaround, with only narrow emergency and consent exceptions.
Bars federal officers from collecting communications when everyone involved is known to be inside the United States, except under a FISA order or a genuine imminent-harm emergency reported to Congress within 14 days.
Prohibits intelligence agencies from buying or otherwise acquiring commercial datasets of Americans' personal 'covered data' (location, identifiers, and other data linkable to a person) that the government would normally need legal process to compel, closing the commercial data-broker loophole; allows it only under enumerated exceptions (court order, consent, narrow emergencies, employment vetting, segregation infeasibility, or foreign data otherwise compellable).
Requires the Attorney General to adopt procedures to minimize, segregate, and promptly destroy improperly acquired covered data, bars its use as evidence, and mandates annual public and congressional reporting on what personal data agencies acquire.
Requires the government to obtain a warrant to get a person's stored communications content, location information, web-browsing records, and search-query records from online service providers, and ends the old rule that let the government take email older than 180 days without a warrant (the 'Email Privacy Act').
Makes it harder to get a pen-register/trap-and-trace surveillance order: a judge now 'may' (rather than 'shall') approve one, and only after the government submits specific, articulable facts showing reasonable grounds, instead of a bare certification.
Requires a warrant to install a tracking device and converts the old mobile-tracking-device provision into a warrant-based tracking-order regime for federal agencies.
Bars federal agencies from obtaining records or evidence from a state or local agency if that data was gathered in a way that would have violated federal law had the federal government done it, and makes such laundered data inadmissible.
Strengthens the independent 'friend of the court' (amicus) role before the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court: makes appointment mandatory, requires members with legal, technical, cybersecurity, and cryptography expertise and security clearances, and gives them access to the materials and advance notice needed to argue for individuals' privacy and civil-liberties interests.
Requires Inspectors General at the Justice Department and each intelligence agency to audit FISA applications and Section 702 directives for accuracy and safeguards, report findings to Congress, the oversight board, and the court, and publish unclassified versions.
Adds new public-transparency and oversight duties, including a Director of National Intelligence public good-faith estimate of how many Americans' communications are collected under Section 702, expanded Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reporting on surveillance of First-Amendment activity and protected classes, and annual compliance assessments.
Extends the authority for the Section 702 foreign-intelligence surveillance program, setting its new sunset date at April 20, 2030, continuing the program while imposing the new limits above.
Who it helps · who it burdens.
Who it helps
- People in the U.S. whose data is held by tech and communications providersGain a warrant requirement before the government can obtain their stored emails, location data, web-browsing history, and search queries, and before officials can read communications content surfaced by intelligence-database queries.
- Online service providers receiving government data demandsGet clearer legal standards requiring the government to present a warrant for stored content, location, browsing, and search records.
Who it burdens
- Federal intelligence and law-enforcement agenciesTake on new mandatory duties: get warrants/court orders for previously warrantless access, stop buying commercial data on Americans, keep detailed audited records of every query, and submit to Inspector General audits and reporting.
- Commercial data brokers selling to the governmentLose intelligence-agency customers for datasets containing Americans' 'covered data,' because agencies are barred from acquiring that data outside narrow exceptions.
- Online service providersMust respond to warrants under restructured stored-communications procedures (new section 2703A and disclosure-timing rules).